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Introduction
The successful elimination of child labour throughout the world is probably one of the most important policy objectives of our time. The size and shape of the problem are of enormous proportions. According to recent estimates by the International Labour Organisation (ILO), there are more than 245 million child labourers worldwide.
1 Yet the magnitude of the tragedy and human suffering is not captured by an aggregated number alone. Conditions of children at work vary significantly. Some of them are at very high danger, as they work in hazardous industries under appellant working conditions, risking accidents and injuries. It has been estimated that some 180 million adolescents are subject to the "worst forms" of child labour, those that are inexcusable under any circumstances (ILO, 2002) . This amounts to one child in every eight in the world.
The child labour problem is particularly severe in the Asia-Pacific region and subSaharan Africa, where on average 19 and 29 per cent of the children aged 5-14, respectively, are economically active. In some countries, such as Burundi and Mali, it has been estimated that approximately half of the total child population (aged 10-14) are at work. Consequently, child labour amounts to a significant proportion of the total work force in poorer countries. Estimates suggests that child workers account for more than 7 per cent of the total labour force in developing countries, with even higher numbers in Africa (ILO, 2002; World Bank, 2002) .
The causes and economic consequences of child labour have been analysed in depth by Basu and Van (1998) , Brown, Deardorff and Stern (2001) , as well as by Baland and Robinson (2000) . 2 Moreover, regarding the empirical evidence on the effects of child labour, most studies focused on human capital levels, GDP growth rates or the determinants of child labour itself. 3 Obviously, child labour is detrimental to economic development, as it means that the next generation of workers will be less well educated 1 See the most recent ILO report on child labour (ILO, 2002) . The figure applies to the year 2000.
and, hence, less skilled. Lower human capital levels then are likely to affect GDP growth rates negatively.
Yet there is also concern that countries which use (or allow) child labour may increase their (cost) competitiveness and, thus, influence trade flows or may attract more foreign direct investment (FDI) . In this respect, child labour has been discussed within a wider range of topics related to labour standards in general, which also include forced labour, union rights and discrimination in employment. Concerns have been raised that there might be a "race to the bottom" on such standards (Palley, 2002 European Union still insisted on the inclusion of labour standards in the new multilateral trade round, but this second attempt was also rejected by developing countries, which fear that high-income nations will try to excuse protectionist measures against foreign competition by alleging their rivals use, say, child labour.
Given that the issue of child labour ranks relatively high on the international policy agenda, it is rather surprising that there is little empirical evidence on the linkage between the increasing economic integration of the world economy 4 and the extent of child labour. In fact, five studies have addressed the relationship between trade and child labour or FDI and child labour. 5 The first empirical attempt was made by Rodrik (1996) , who focused on the ratio of textile and clothing exports to total exports, but did not find a statistically significant link to his measure of child labour. Busse (2002) , on the other hand, indicated that comparative advantage and the extent of child labour might be associated to some extent, but concentrated his analysis more on labour standards in general. Mah (1997) regressed export shares of GDP on the ratification of fundamental ILO conventions and found that they are negatively correlated. Yet he did not incorporate any indicator that measures compliance with rather than ratification of
ILO conventions
Regarding the link between FDI inflows and child labour, Cooke and Noble (1998) concentrated on the relationship between the number of ratified ILO conventions and United States FDI abroad. They found a positive and statistically significant relationship between the two, which implies that US companies favour countries with a stronger record of ratifications of ILO conventions as an investment location. Similar to Mah, they did not include any indicator that focuses on the observance of these conventions.
In contrast, Kucera (2002) regressed a number of indicators for the observed extent of influence child labour has on FDI inflows, but his results were not statistically significant. To sum up, the empirical evidence available in the literature has been rather inconclusive.
Apart from these empirical studies there is some anecdotal evidence of international linkages between the use of child labour and trade/investment. In India, Pakistan and Nepal, for instance, it has been reported that children have been used for the production of carpets, textiles and/or clothing (Bales, 2000) . Since these commodities are (partly) exported to North America and Europe, national and international competitors are worried about an unfair cost advantage, as children are paid very low wages (Brown, 2000) . Moreover, multinational enterprises are frequently accused by non-governmental organisations of employing child labour in their oversees production facilities.
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Against this background, the paper focuses on three issues: (1) whether child labour affects FDI flows; (2) whether child labour is closely associated with the structure of trade flows, that is, comparative advantage in particular in commodities that use a higher extent of child labour; and (3) how to deal with child labour. In the following section, child labour is defined and the corresponding ILO conventions are introduced.
Section 3 considers the data, that is, how to measure child labour, and presents the indicators used in the regressions. The results of the empirical analysis of the linkage between child labour and FDI/comparative advantage are reported in Section 4. Finally, some policy implications on how to deal with child labour and concluding remarks are found in Section 5.
Definition of Child Labour and ILO Conventions
In order to analyse the problem of child labour effectively, the term itself should be clarified first. Generally, child labour refers to work that is exploitative and detrimental to the development of the child. This definition excludes activities such as light work after school and takes into account that work does not necessarily jeopardise the development of young people and can even be advantageous for them. The ILO (2002) identifies three categories of child labour to be abolished in its Global Report on the issue:
(a) Labour performed by a child who is under a minimum age, specified in national legislation for that kind of work.
(b) Hazardous work that compromises the physical, mental or moral well being of a child.
(c) The unconditional worst forms of child labour, which include slavery, debt bondage and similar practices, sex work, and illicit activities.
This classification reflects the provision of the ILO conventions on child labour.
Convention No. 138, adopted in 1973, aims at the establishment of a minimum age for child work consistent with the development and maturity of young persons. Therefore, it stipulates that the minimum age for admission to employment should not fall short of the age of completion of compulsory schooling and should not be less than 15 years. CHILD1 exactly opposite to the ILO ensures a straightforward interpretation of the subsequent results, as a higher number in any of the four indicators implies a higher standard (or less child labour). 11 Next, for the gross secondary school enrolment rate (in per cent), SECSCHOOL will be used. Secondary education completes the provision of basic education that began at the primary level, and usually relates to the age group of 10 to 15 years. Though the non-prevalence of child labour and school attendance are highly correlated (see Table 1 ), SECSCHOOL may act as a helpful complement to CHILD1, as both indicators can be problematic. For instance, children who are not attending school do not automatically work. Also, some children have to work to 11 Data sources of all variables can be found in Appendix A.
finance their school attendance. By employing both indicators, the inevitable measurement error in each of them is thus likely to be minimised.
The third variable is CHILD2, representing the indicator for the degree of child labour as suggested by Rodrik (1996) . The number of ratified ILO conventions on child labour appears to be a poor measure of the level and extent of child labour. The computed partial correlations between the number of ratifications for the two conventions and the three indicators for child labour -in the range between -0.01 and 0.13 -are rather low (Table 1 ). Sometimes the interpretation or exact phrasing of the child-labour conventions contradicts national laws or regulations (OECD, 1996 (OECD, , 2000 . On the other hand, ratifying a particular convention does not automatically imply its thorough observance. For instance, while Rwanda has ratified both conventions, it has a severe child labour problem, whereas the United States has ratified only one, but does not have any troubles with child labour in practice (ILO, 2002).
All four child labour indicators are positively correlated with GDP per capita, indicating that higher income levels are associated with a lower extent of child labour. This strengthens the impression that poverty and underdevelopment are probably the most important determinants of child labour. 13 On the other hand, CHILD1, CHILD2 and SECSCHOOL might act as substitutes for other country characteristics that have not been considered so far. These might comprise certain economic, social or political circumstances, thereby leading to biased regression results. Though these other determinants are obviously difficult to measure, we have tried to control for the widest possible range of additional factors. Accordingly, the two Freedom House (2002) indicators for civil liberties and political rights, which deal with a relatively extensive 13 See the empirical evidence presented by Shelburne (2001) , but also more recent studies by Cigno et al. (2002) or Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) .
scope of all kinds of basic human and political rights, have been included in the (FDI)
regressions.
Both Freedom House indicators are measured on a scale of 1 to 7, where higher numbers imply fewer liberties and rights. To reduce the problem of multicollinearity between two highly correlated variables, both are merged to DEMOCRACY:
This transformation has been suggested by Helliwell (1994) and will lead to a single indicator, which varies from 0 (no political rights and civil liberties) to 1 (complete set of political rights and civil liberties). Considering the partial correlations in a range between 0.38 and 0.54, CHILD1, CHILD2 and SECSCHOOL are correlated to some degree with this synthetic indicator.
Empirical Evidence
Following the introduction of the four measures of the extent of child labour, we now turn to the linkage between these indicators and FDI and trade flows. In Table 2 16 Included were all 132 countries that reported the data for all five variables. Similar to most studies on FDI flows, a semilog model has been used. See Appendix A for data sources; standard errors, which have been checked for heteroskedasticity, are reported in parentheses; multicollinearity has been tested by the creation of variance inflation factors (VIF); all regressions pass the test at conventional levels; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Though the coefficient for CHILD2, as a further indicator for the extent of child labour, is also positive, it is not statistically significant. One reason for this result maybe the way CHILD2 was defined. In comparison to CHILD1 and SECSCHOOL it is less accurate, as it allows only for a rather crude measurement of the extent of child labour. As can be seen in Table 3 , the results of the additional set of regressions on FDI flows are very similar to those of the previous set. Even if the overall fit of the benchmark and the other regressions deteriorates somewhat, signs and statistical significance of all variables are very similar. Yet the statistical significance of SECSCHOOL worsens from the 1 to the 10 per cent level and the coefficient for CHILD2 becomes negative (though still not significant). In general, these results confirm those of the first set of empirical estimates, that is, the level of child labour is negatively associated with FDI flows -whether the focus is on all countries or relatively poor developing countries only. 17 Contrary to the frequent accusations of non-governmental organisations, it appears that -on average -multinational enterprises do care where they invest, i.e. in countries with a higher GDP and growth rates, lower trade barriers, improved democratic rights -and less child labour. On the other hand, these results may be driven by international campaigns of non-governmental organisations, fighting multinationals that do not observe basic rules with respect to child labour. But without accurate and comparable data for longer periods, which are not available, there is no definite answer on the likely reasons for these results. Table 2 for further notes; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
Next, the linkage between child labour and international trade will be explored. It is rather unlikely that the use of child labour affects significantly the overall export performance of a country, but rather the structure of trade flows. More specifically, the impact is most likely to be felt in labour-intensive commodities that may use unskilled labour to a relatively large extent. The main focus regarding trade is, thus, on the linkage between child labour and the structure of trade flows or comparative advantage in unskilled-labour-intensive manufactured goods.
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For a start, consider a standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade model with two production factors, skilled and unskilled labour, and two products, software and toys. Assume that both countries produce both goods by using both factors, trade with each other and fully respect labour standards in the initial situation. Now consider an increase in child labour in only one country. In the short run, the number of additional workers will increase the endowment of unskilled labour and expand production possibilities with a bias towards the unskilled-labour-intensive good (toys). 20 As the production of toys increases relative to that of software, the country (gains or) improves its comparative advantage in the production of toys. Moreover, in the case of a large country, the increased (export)
supply of toys causes their world market price to fall, representing a decline in the terms of trade of that country.
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Included in the regression analysis are those manufactured goods that have two features: a high-labour and a low-technology intensity, for example toys, clothing, textiles, clothing, and footwear, goods which are unskilled-labour intensive. 22 The relative Programme, as a proxy for human capital levels. The first control variable is expected to 20 Modelling the effect of child labour as the accumulation of a production factor is simply applying the Rybczynski (1955) theorem. 21 Note that trade and welfare levels in both countries are likely to increase due to the use of child labour in only one country. However, the deterioration in the terms of trade could offset the welfare gains from the growth in the unskilled labour force, thereby making the economy worse off. This phenomenon is called immiserizing growth (Bhagwati, 1958) . Obviously, any increases in welfare levels are due to the structure of the model, as the use of child labour will increase production possibilities. Child labour itself is not incorporated in the utility function (OECD, 1996) . Such an approach is far beyond the main focus of this part of the paper, that is, the linkage between child labour and comparative advantage, and therefore excluded from the analysis. 22 All commodities and the corresponding SITC numbers are listed in Appendix B.
23 The data on labour-intensive commodities has been taken from Tyers et al. (1987) .
be positively associated with comparative advantage in labour-intensive goods, whereas the latter is likely to be negatively correlated with EXPLABINT.
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The results of the benchmark regression, reported in column 1 of Table 4, Table 2 ; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
The number of ratified ILO conventions on child labour seems not to significantly influence comparative advantage in exports of labour-intensive goods. The coefficient for CONVENTION is positive, which implies that a higher number of ratified conventions is positively associated with comparative advantage, but not statistically significant.
So far, it has been assumed that child labour is exogenous with respect to FDI and comparative advantage. In the case of FDI, this assumption seems appropriate, since both the proportion of FDI inflows to the total capital stock and the proportion of workers employed in transplants of multinationals to the total labour force of a country are usually rather small. However, the question is whether the same applies to trade.
Second-best trade models frequently assume that not only protectionism, but also national regulations are influenced by trade flows (Trefler, 1993) . It is feasible, for instance, that if a comparative advantage in unskilled-labour-intensive commodities declines, the reaction of a government may be to reduce the stringency or enforcement of child labour regulations. Such a linkage could for that reason offset any impact of child labour on comparative advantage, and hence must be controlled for. In such a situation, it seems appropriate to estimate simultaneous equations whereby the impact of child labour on the structure of trade flows is estimated in a manner that controls for simultaneity between these two variables.
In a further set of regressions, the determinants of the extent of child labour are included. Given that child labour is above all influenced by income levels, GDP per capita is used as the key control variable. The results, reported in Table 5 , show that there is little influence of trade on the extent of child labour. CHILD1 and SECSCHOOL are not statistically significant, only CHILD2 is significant, but barely, at the 10 per cent level. Again, this result may be driven by the definition of CHILD2.
CHILD1 and SECSCHOOL are likely to measure the extent of child labour more accurately. Table 2 ; estimated using 2SLS; the sign and significance of the determinants of labour-intensive exports are almost identical to those provided in Table 4 . For reasons of space, these have not been reported; *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
In sum, the results regarding comparative advantage and child labour imply that industrialised countries do not have a economic problem with child labour in developing countries; they even "profit" from its occurrence due to lower prices for unskilled-labour-intensive goods (or improved terms of trade). On the other hand, developing countries may suffer by using child labour, as the long-term growth prospects are diminished as a result of lower human capital levels. Developing countries that do not have a problem with child labour might also be negatively affected, since their relative comparative advantage in unskilled-labour-intensive goods is likely to erode if other countries with a similar factor endowment use child labour. Importantly, this link applies not to total export performance, but rather to the structure of trade flows.
Interestingly, the empirical results with respect to comparative advantage and FDI tend to pull in opposite directions, since the extent of child labour is negatively linked with FDI. One likely explanation for this outcome could be that multinational enterprises are highly sensitive to host country characteristics such as democratic rights or child labour.
In this way, the findings presented in this paper confirm the results of recent empirical studies that have analysed the linkages between FDI and democratic rights. These studies indicate that -on average -multinational enterprises invest in countries, where other fundamental human and workers' rights, such as basic union rights, the abolition of forced labour and no discrimination in employment, are ensured. 25 On the other hand, by using child labour, domestic firms are able to increase their (national) comparative advantage in unskilled-labour-intensive goods. International campaigns by nongovernmental organisations against child labour are less likely to focus on these companies providing that they are not partly or fully owned by multinational enterprises or do not act as a important supplier of (semi-) manufactured goods that are to be exported for further processing in high-income OECD countries.
Policy Implications and Concluding Remarks
Summing up the empirical evidence, there seems to be no problem with FDI and child labour, but rather with the link between child labour and comparative advantages in unskilled-labour-intensive goods. This result gives rise to the question of appropriate measures to fight child labour effectively and help to avoid competitive edges (with respect to the export structure) in international trade. In the international arena, it is often argued that sanctions should be imposed on commodities from countries with poor labour standards, especially with regard to children. Advocates of this position, typically from developed countries, argue for linking trade and core labour standards, preferably within the framework of the WTO, thereby creating incentives for developing countries to raise labour standards.
The effectiveness of trade sanctions as an instrument in the fight against child labour is highly questionable. First of all, sanctions fail to take into account that most parents send their children to work to escape extreme poverty and hunger and not because they are selfish or sloth. Rogers and Swinnerton (2001) have estimated that families cannot survive without additional income from children if GDP per worker falls below US $5,020. Hence, child labour as a mass phenomenon has to be distinguished from child abuse (Basu, 1999) . 27 Focussing on the determinants of child labour, Shelburne (2001) found that trade openness reduces the benefits of child labour to other members of the society and, thus, the incentive to use children as workers. In an extensive case study, Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) came to the conclusion that the economic integration of Vietnam into the international trading community in the 1990s reduced the prevalence of child labour significantly. The income of adults (parents) went up due to a real increase in the price of the exported good (rice), thereby reducing the need to rely on child labour for parents.
If the negative linkage between child labour and openness to trade is accepted, trade sanctions are ineffective or even counter-productive as a remedy for child labour. Thus, the inclusion of labour standards, especially those concerning child labour, in the rules and mandate of the WTO is not appropriate. Their enforcement may even be abused by richer countries to protect their markets against goods from developing countries with poorer standards, thereby compromising the economic development of low-income countries. Another approach that has found increasing support is to inform the consumer about the conditions under which goods are produced via product labelling. This policy uses the market mechanism and leaves the decision of whether or not to boycott a product made with child labour to the consumer. 28 Although appealing on first sight, product labelling suffers from several weaknesses. Firstly, firms face an incentive to exaggerate the labour conditions in their workplace. Even if one can circumvent this information problem, labour standards and conditions of work are unlikely to be represented accurately on simple labels (Rodrik, 1996) . Finally and probably most important, product labelling shares problems with trade sanctions as it attacks child labour only in a few export-goods sectors and, hence, may push children into even more harmful activities.
In order to fight child labour effectively, people in the developed countries have to realise that child labour cannot be simply banned by legal action without pushing poorer households into even greater poverty. As the example of the dismissed children in Bangladesh shows, child labour cannot be abolished at once but must be abandoned in a planned and phased manner. Activities have to contain economic incentives for families to pull their children out of the labour force. For instance, school meals or subsidies can make it more attractive for parents to send their children to school. Industrialised nations and international organisations can contribute to the financing of such efforts. In contrast to sanctions and other punishments that take away choices, incentive schemes open up new and improved alternatives to families without taking away existing choices. For the success of such programmes, it is important that education subsidies replace a significant part of the child's contribution to family income.
A second ingredient of an effective policy against child labour is to promote the development of functioning credit markets in developing countries and to facilitate the access to these markets for poorer households. With access to capital markets, parents will arguably allocate more of their children's time to education, since they will be able to shift wealth from the future to the present by borrowing against future income. In contrast, the absence of functioning credit markets leaves the parents without any choice but to put children at work and results in inadequate human capital formation. Moreover, in the area of international labour standards, one must distinguish universally applicable standards from those depending on the level of development of a country.
Beyond any doubt, every country should adhere to some basic standards, such as the ban of any form of forced child labour. The fundamental rights at work as defined by the ILO can be considered as a reasonable set of minimal labour standards, although the effective abolition of child labour should be regarded as a target for the long run. While some labour standards are universal, other standards should clearly allow for differences in the level of development of a country. Historically, labour standards have risen with economic progress. Hence, several standards, such as minimum wages or the minimum age for admission to employment, depend on a nation's productive capacity and should be scaled according to this capacity. Poorer countries simply cannot afford to "buy" the same labour standards as advanced countries and would be adversely affected by them.
Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, there is some scope for international labour standards in general as well as with regard to the problem of child labour. This raises the question of who should monitor compliance to these standards. From our point of view, the enforcement of international labour standards should be left to the ILO for several reasons. First of all, the ILO already plays a very important role in the promotion of fundamental working rights through technical assistance, arguably the most effective instrument to achieve compliance to labour standards. In the case of child labour, the IPEC, run by the ILO, has been at the forefront of international efforts to tackle the problem. Next, a very large number of different countries are organised in the ILO. Finally, the use of ILO conventions, which nations are encouraged to sign and are required to comply to, is anything but a powerless instrument.
In an increasingly interconnected world, countries are likely to be adversely affected by the violation of convention. For instance, multinationals fear reputation effects and, hence, will refrain from investment in those countries, as the empirical evidence presented in this paper shows. If necessary, ILO conventions can also be backed by punitive action. Article 33 of the ILO constitution provides an appropriate instrument, authorising the ILO to take actions against member states that do not comply with recommendations made by a Commission of Inquiry established to examine grave violations of the conventions. It would be desirable, however, to put the provision in more concrete terms by substantiating possible measures. Finally, to achieve the largest feasible reduction in child labour, action should not be product-specific or related to export industries only, as this might simply drive children from one sector into another, but rather country-specific. If sanctions are considered, these should include to widest possible range of economic instruments, such as restrictions on trade in general, FDI, or capital controls. Yet the experience of such restrictions in the past, for instance in South Africa, suggests that they are not likely to have to desired outcome (Hufbauer et al., 1990 ).
